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WILL ARTICLE III OF THE MOON TREATY
IMPROVE EXISTING LAW?:
A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
REX

J.

ZEDALIS*

I. INTRODUCTION

International lawyers are becoming increasingly interested in
analyzing the international legal principles designed to govern
the utilization of resources on the moon and other celestial
bodies by private enterprise. 1 Recently, particular attention has
been devoted to the principles proposed in various provisions of
the Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty).2 While the importance of
analyzing these provisions of the Moon Treaty is beyond question, it would appear that, since technological developments in
military weaponry capable of being used in the extraterrestrial
realm (e.g., anti-satellite weapons 3 and particle beam weapons 4 )
* Cutting Fellow and J.S.D. candidate, Columbia University, 1980-81; LL.M. (magna
cum laude), George Washington University, 1978; J.D., Pepperdine University, 1976;
B.A. (cum laude), California State University, 1973. Attorney, Foreign Agriculture
Division, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1978-80; Office of the General Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commission, 1977-78. Research
Associate, International and Comparative Law Department, George Washington
University, 1978-79. Member of the California Bar and American Society of International Law.
1. See The Role of Private Enterprisein Outer Space-InternationalLegal Implication, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1979) (presenting symposium on international legal implications of private enterprise in outer space).
2. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 1051L. 113/Add.4 (1979). The Agreement was approved by the
General Assembly and opened for signature on December 18, 1979, U.N. Doc.
A/Res./34/68 (1979) [hereinafter cited as the Moon Treaty]. At the writing of this article
it was being considered by the United States Senate under article II of the Constitution.
3. See Robinson, Soviets Pushfor Beam Weapons, 106 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH. 16
(1977) (discussing development of particle beam weapons). For an analysis of the controlling legal principles, see Zedalis and Wade, Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Outer
Space Treaty of 1967, 8 CAL. W. INTL L.J. 454 (1978).
4. Militarily useful technological developments are also affecting other transnational
spatial areas. See Zedalis, Military Uses of Ocean Space and the Developing International Law of the Sea: An Analysis in the Context of Peacetime ASW, 16 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 575 (1979) (examining legal prescriptions on peacetime military uses of ocean) and
Zedalis, "Peaceful Purposes" and Other Relevant Provisions of the Revised Composite
Negotiating Text: A ComparativeAnalysis of the Existing and the Proposed Military
Regime for the High Seas, 8 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. AND COMM. - (1980).
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continue to progress at an exponential rate, an examination of
the principles which affect military activities merits at least
equal or even perhaps greater attention. This is especially so in
view of the fact that extensive military use could disrupt activities by private enterprise. In this respect, article III of the
Moon Treaty states:
1. The moon shall be used by all States Parties exclusively
for peaceful purposes.
2. Any threat or use of force or any other hostile act or
threat of hostile act on the moon is prohibited. It is likewise
prohibited to use the moon in order to commit any such act
or to engage in any such threat in relation to the earth, the
moon, spacecraft, the personnel of spacecraft or man-made
space objects.
3. States Parties shall not place in orbit around or other
trajectory to or around the moon objects carrying nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction
or place or use such weapons on or in the moon.
4. The establishment of military bases, installations and
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the
conduct of military maneuvers on the moon shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or
for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The
use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful ex-5
ploration and use of the moon shall also not be prohibited.
Article III and the other provisions of the Moon Treaty reflect
the stated desire of the drafters to "define and develop" the
principles established by earlier conventions dealing with man's
extraterrestrial activities. 6 In particular, it would appear that
article III seeks to "define and develop" the principles of article
IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the

5. Moon Treaty, supranote 2.
6. The Preamble of the Moon Treaty, supra note 2, provides in pertinent part:
Recalling the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies,...
Taking into account the need to define and develop the provisions of these international instruments in relation to the moon and other celestial bodies,
having regard to further progress in the exploration and use of outer
space,...

1980]

MOON TREATY

Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty). 7 Article
IV of the Outer Space Treaty provides:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons
or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install
such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons
in outer space in any other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all
States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations
and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and
the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall
be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific
research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be
prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary
for peaceful exploration of 8the moon and celestial bodies
shall also not be prohibited.
This brief commentary examines article III of the Moon
Treaty in order to determine whether, and if so, the extent to
which, it actually satisfies the desire of the drafters to "define
and develop" the principles enunciated in article IV of the Outer
Space Treaty. This will be accomplished by indicating the limitations and ambiguities of the various principles in article IV of
the Outer Space Treaty which apply to the moon and other
celestial bodies and then discussing the ways in which the corresponding principles of article III of the Moon Treaty propose,
or for that matter fail to secure, improvement. It should be
noted that since the Moon Treaty is devoted exclusively to
establishing principles which apply to the moon and other
celestial bodies, as well as trajectories to or around such, 9
reference to article IV of the Outer Space Treaty will not emphasize those principles applicable to outer space in general that is, that vast area of space which exists between celestial
bodies.
7. Treaty on Use of Outer Space, Jan. 27-Oct. 10, 1967, United States-United
Kingdom-U.S.S.R., art. III & IV, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2413, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610
U.N.T.S.205 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty].
8. Id. at art. IV, 18 U.S.T. at 2413-14.
9. Moon Treaty, supra note 2, states at art. 1(2), "For the purposes of this Agreement reference to the moon shall include orbits around or other trajectories to or
around it."
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DENUCLEARIZATION OF CELESTIAL BODIES

By the language of the first paragraph of article IV of the
Outer Space Treaty, States Parties undertake, inter alia,not to
"install" nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction
"on" "celestial bodies" or "station" such weapons in "outer
space" in any other manner. 10 The emphasized terms utilized in
the first paragraph to describe the nature of the undertaking
give rise to at least five basic points of interest. Each of these
seems to be addressed in some fashion by article III of the Moon
Treaty.
The first point of interest concerns the language of the opening paragraph of article IV of the Outer Space Treaty and its
failure to mention the moon in its prohibition of the installation
of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Some
might argue that since the Treaty mentions the moon whenever
it intends a specific principle to apply to the moon, failure to
make reference to it in the first paragraph indicates that the
prohibition was not intended to apply to the moon. 1' Of course
in opposition to this reading it might be suggested that since the
moon is a celestial body, reference to the fact that the prohibition applies to "celestial bodies" is more than sufficient to indicate that States Parties are prohibited from installing such
weapons on the moon. 12 The ramifications of either construction are hardly insignificant.
The Moon Treaty goes a long way towards eliminating potential disputes over the question of whether members of the international community are permitted lawfully to install nuclear
10. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV, 18 U.S.T. at 2413-14 (describing
denuclearization).

11. N.

MATTE, AEROSPACE LAW

299 (1969). Matte, for example, states in pertinent

part:
[In] accordance with the structo sensu interpretation of the law of treaties, the
fact that the expression 'the moon and other celestial bodies' is used at the
beginning of the second paragraph of the same article.. ., might mean that the
expression 'celestial bodies' when used by itself should be interpreted as excluding the moon. The result of such an interpretation would mean that the installation of nuclear weapons on the moon would be permissible.
12. See generally Wehringer, The Treaty on Outer Space, 54 A.B.A. J. 586, 587
(1968) (interpreting treaty as prohibiting weapons of mass destruction in space or on
any celestial body).
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weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the moon. In
fact, the drafters have taken great pains to make it perfectly
clear that all the provisions of the Moon Treaty, including article 111(3) which contains a prohibition virtually identical to the
one in the first paragraph of article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty, apply to celestial bodies and the moon. This is accomplished by specifically referring to the moon in the articulation of each principle and then stating in article 1(1) that "[t]he
provisions of this Agreement relating to the moon shall also apply to other celestial bodies within the solar system .... " (Emphasis added). 13 Language to this effect should make it indubitably clear that the Moon Treaty prohibits the installation
of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the
moon or any other celestial body.
The second point of interest concerns the utilization of the
term "install" in the first paragraph of article IV of the Outer
Space Treaty to describe what States Parties were prohibited
from doing with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction on celestial bodies. Since the term "install" connotes the existence of some indication of at least relative permanency, evidenced by such things as affixation, attachment,
or just simple lengthy duration, it would appear that it does not
cover things like the temporary placement of nuclear weapons
or other weapons of mass destruction on celestial bodies. This
could prove to be a significant loophole in the Outer Space
Treaty as increasing visits to celestial bodies provide opportunities for tensions between nations to spread beyond our own
planet.
From the language of article 111(3) of the Moon Treaty, it
would appear that great strides have been made in the direction
of attempting to close this loophole. Article 111(3) proposes to do
much more than just prohibit States Parties from installing
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on
celestial bodies. Specifically, article 111(3) provides that States
Parties shall not "place" such weapons on celestial bodies. The
use of the term "place," instead of the term "install," would
seem to imply that permanent and temporary affixation or at13. Moon Treaty, supra note 2.
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tachment to, as well as the most ephemeral placement of such
weapons on, celestial bodies is prohibited.
The inadvertent positioning of a nuclear weapon or other
weapon of mass destruction on a celestial body would not seem
to be violative of article III of the Moon Treaty. The general
context in which the term "place" is utilized seems to suggest
that only deliberate, volitional location of such weapons on
celestial bodies is prohibited. It is clear, nevertheless, that article 111(3) also prohibits States Parties from orbiting such
weapons around or launching them on a trajectory to or around
celestial bodies. The effect of this additional prohibition should
be to minimize the number of opportunities for nuclear weapons
or other weapons of mass destruction to adventitiously find
their way to the surface of celestial bodies.
The third point of interest derives from the language of the
first paragraph of article IV of the Outer Space Treaty as simply prohibiting States Parties from installing nuclear weapons or
other weapons of mass destruction "on" celestial bodies. Use of
the term "on," rather than both the terms "on" and "in," provides some justification for arguing that the first paragraph
prohibits the installation of such weapons only on the surface of,
and not inside of, celestial bodies. However, this emphasizes the
pedestrian distinction between "on" and "in" and ignores the
possibility that the term "on" might simultaneously encompass
what both the terms "on" and "in" encompass independently.
Specifically, the language prohibiting States Parties from installing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction
"on" celestial bodies may well prohibit installation "to"
celestial bodies. Assuming that this is so, it would seem that the
installation of such weapons is prohibited whether the installation is "to" the surface or the subsurface of celestial bodies.
This reading is particularly attractive when it is recognized that
the installation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction inches below the surface of celestial bodies may well
have the same consequences as installation right on the surface.
Given this, it is strange to think that the drafters of the first
paragraph of article IV intended to prohibit one but not the
other type of installation.
Whatever possible confusion exists on the question of
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whether the Outer Space Treaty prohibits States Parties from
installing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction below the surface of celestial bodies, the position of the
Moon Treaty is impeccably clear. Article 111(3) proposes to prohibit States Parties from placing such weapons "on" as well as
"in" celestial bodies. In doing so it averts a whole plethora of
disputes that would inevitably arise out of attempts to emplant
such weapons below the surface of celestial bodies on the basis
that such efforts are not explicitly prohibited by the Outer
Space Treaty. The addition of language making it clear that
States Parties are prohibited from emplanting such weapons
below the surface of celestial bodies is a major improvement on
the Outer Space Treaty.
The fourth point of interest deals with the failure of the first
paragraph of article IV of the Outer Space Treaty to establish a
comprehensive prohibition relating to the entire spectrum of
possible activities involving nuclear weapons or other weapons
of mass destruction. Specifically, though the second sentence of
the second paragraph of article IV of the Outer Space Treaty
prohibits the testing of such weapons on celestial bodies, and
the first paragraph of article IV prohibits the installation of
such weapons on celestial bodies, there is nothing in the first
paragraph which prohibits the operational "use" of such
weapons once positioned on celestial bodies. As a result, one
might argue that once such weapons are positioned on celestial
bodies, nothing in the first paragraph prohibits a State Party
from operationally using them. It seems, however, a distention
of logic to imagine that the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty
intended consciously to prohibit installation and testing of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, but
not their actual operational use. This is particularly apparent
when it is recognized that as compared to use, testing and installation are hardly monumental events.
The failure of the Outer Space Treaty to prohibit the operational use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction is corrected by article 111(3) of the Moon Treaty. More
precisely, article 111(3) proposes to make it perfectly clear that
States Parties to the Moon Treaty agree to go beyond the circumscribed commitment of the first paragraph of article IV of
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the Outer Space Treaty and obligate themselves not to "use"
such weapons on or in celestial bodies. 14 Since article 111(4) of
the Moon Treaty explicitly prohibits the testing of all weapons,
the prohibition of "use" would seem indubitably to be directed
at operational use. Furthermore, it would appear that the prohibition of "use" is designed to encompass actual detonation
and not the use accompanying manipulative posturing for some
international political or military advantage. The latter type of
use would seem to be adequately addressed by the prohibition
against placing such weapons on celestial bodies. 15 Article 111(3)
thus spans the entire range of activities from momentary placement or installation on or in, to use on or in celestial bodies.
The fifth and final point of interest concerns the interpretation of the first paragraph of article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty as not prohibiting States Parties from placing nuclear
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit around
celestial bodies, including the moon. 16 It cannot be denied that
the language of the first paragraph lends itself to just such a
construction. Although the first paragraph purports to prohibit
States Parties from orbiting such weapons, the language refers
only to the orbiting of the "Earth" and says nothing of the orbiting of celestial bodies. Indeed, when the first paragraph
specifically refers to celestial bodies, it simply does so in the
context of obligating States Parties to refrain from installing
such weapons on celestial bodies.
Though there is a certain amount of merit to this interpretation of the first paragraph of article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty, in view of the language in that same paragraph by
which States Parties undertake not to "station" nuclear
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in "outer space"
in "any other manner," it could be argued that the placing of
17
such weapons in orbit around any celestial body is prohibited.
14. Moon Treaty, supra note 2 and accompanying text of art. 111(3).
15. Id.
16. For this view, see Zedalis and Wade, supra note 3, at 461.
17. This construction is supported by U.N. Doc. A/7221 (1968). See also Proposed
Treaty on Outer Space: Hearingson Executive D Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967) (testimony of Arthur Goldberg denying that
art. IV(1) permits weapons to orbit moon).
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After all, celestial bodies are enveloped by outer space and an
orbit in such area could well be viewed as a stationing in "any
other manner." Nevertheless, since the term "station," even
though modified by the phrase "any other manner," seems to
connote at least some recurrence of an activity, there is enough
ambiguity to suggest that perhaps the prohibition is not designed to proscribe a single orbit of a celestial body, but rather
only a series of recurring single orbits or continual orbiting.
Article 111(3) of the Moon Treaty eliminates any potential controversy over this matter by prohibiting States Parties from
placing such weapons in "orbit" around celestial bodies, including the moon.' 8 In addition, article 111(3) goes much further
than the first paragraph of article IV of the Outer Space Treaty
and prohibits States Parties from placing such weapons in some
"other trajectory to or around" celestial bodies. 19 It would appear that the effect of this latter provision is to proscribe activities such as the launching of nuclear weapons from a location
other than a celestial body, if directed at some target on a
celestial body, and the placing of nuclear weapons in outer
space above the surface of a celestial body in a trajectory that
does not result in the completion of one full orbit. Like the other
proposal in article 111(3) of the Moon Treaty to prohibit the
"use" of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction
on celestial bodies, the language of article 111(3) covering the
"orbit" of and "other trajectory to or around" celestial bodies is
a vast improvement on the Outer Space Treaty.
III. USE OF

CELESTIAL BODIES FOR OTHER TYPES

OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

As can be seen, article 111(3) of the Moon Treaty is a substantial improvement on article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. What
follows will indicate that the same cannot be said with respect to
the language in article III(1) of the Moon Treaty which oblikates
States Parties to utilize celestial bodies, including the moon, only for purposes which are peaceful.
18. Moon Treaty, supranote 2 and accompanying text of art. 111(3).
19. Id.
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1. "Peaceful Purposes": TraditionalViews
Article 111(1) provides that States Parties shall use all celestial
bodies, including the moon, "exclusively for peaceful
purposes." ' 20 The use of identical language in the second
paragraph of article IV of the Outer Space Treaty to describe a
similar obligation has created considerable controversy over the
years with respect to the nature of the normative standard
which "peaceful purposes" prescribes. Two schools of thought
have emerged with respect to this matter, both attempting to
discern the nature of the standard by examining other provisions of the Treaty. One school of thought contends that the requirement to use celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes simply prohibits the conduct of activities of an aggressive
nature.21 The second school goes further and suggests that such
a requirement proscribes the conduct of all activities of a mil22
itary nature, whether or not such activities are aggressive.
Setting aside for the moment any discussion of the impact on
this controversy of the language in article 111(2) of the Moon
Treaty, it would appear that the same arguments adduced with
respect to the meaning of "peaceful purposes" as used in the
20. Moon Treaty, supra note 2 and accompanying text of art. 111(1).
21. See Dembling and Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. &
COM. 419, 434 (1967) (employing international law to interpret "peaceful purposes");
Finch, Outer Space for "Peaceful Purposes," 54 A.B.A. J. 365, 366 (1968) (noting
absence in art. IV of any prohibition against military activities); Soraghan, ReconnaissanceSatellites: Legal Characterizationand Possible Utilizationfor Peacekeeping,
13 McGILL L.J. 458, 466 (1967) (discussing American position that term "peaceful" is
used in contrast to "aggressive" not "military"); Stein, Legal Restraints in Modern
Arms Control Agreements, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 255, 261-62 (1972) (examining argument
that "peaceful purposes" include some military activities); Vlasic, The Space Treaty: A
PreliminaryEvaluation, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 507, 514 (1967) (stating American position
that military activities are sometime non-aggressive).
22. See M. LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 106-07 (1972) (commenting that
"peaceful purposes" and military measures are contradictory); Markoff, Disarmament
and "Peaceful Purposes" Provision in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 4 J. SPACE L. 3, 7
(1976) (observing that military activity is always, actually or potentially, violent and
therefore contrary to "peaceful purposes"); M. Markov, The JuridicalMeaning of the
term "Peaceful" in the 1967 Space Treaty, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIM
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 30 (1968) (maintaining that text of 1967 Space Treaty
defines "peaceful" as not simply "non-aggressive" but more restrictively as "nonmilitary"); M. Markov, Against the So-Called "Broader" Interpretation of the term
"Peaceful" in InternationalSpace Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 73, 75 (1968) (advancing view that use of term "peaceful" in
1967 Space Treaty may include military activity only for terrestial international law).
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second paragraph of article IV of the Outer Space Treaty can
easily be advanced with respect to that term as used in article
III(1) of the Moon Treaty. Take, for example, the arguments
made by those who insist that "peaceful purposes" simply prohibits activities of an aggressive nature. Specifically, it is
claimed that since the opposite of peaceful in the common vernacular is aggressive - not military - the term "peaceful purposes" as used in the second paragraph of article IV of the
Outer Space Treaty must be viewed as going no further than
establishing an international legal standard prohibiting the use
of celestial bodies for activities of an aggressive nature. 23 Additionally, it is claimed that since neither international law nor the
United Nations Charter purports to prohibit every activity of a
military nature, reference in article III of the Outer Space
Treaty 24 to the applicability of international law and the United
Nations Charter to celestial bodies necessarily means that
"peaceful purposes" must be read as prohibiting nothing more
than activities of an aggressive nature. 25 Those who advance
these arguments recognize, nevertheless, that the language in
the second sentence of the second paragraph of article IV departs slighty from this general rule by prohibiting the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, as well
as the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of
military maneuvers, 26 even though these particular activities
may not actually be aggressive.
Both of the above arguments seem to apply equally when attempting to determine the meaning of "peaceful purposes" as
used in article 111(1) of the Moon Treaty. 27 More precisely, there
is no reason to think that the common understanding of the opposite of peaceful has changed in recent years from aggressive
to military. In fact, given the centrality of the notion of
23. Finch, Outer Space for "Peaceful Purposes," 54 A.B.A. J. 365, 366 (1968)
(authorizing military personnel to conduct scientific research and other peaceful activities).
24. See note 36, infra (text of article III of the Outer Space Treaty).
25. Dembling and Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. &
COM. 419, 434 (1967) (discussing whether use of military personnel or equipment would
contravene "peaceful purposes" as defined by 1967 Space Treaty).
26. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7 and accompanying text of art. IV.
27. Moon Treaty, supra note 2 and accompanying text of art. III(1).
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"peaceful purposes," it seems that if the common understanding had changed the drafters of the Moon Treaty would have attempted to capture the change by explicitly defining the term.
Similarly, article II of the Moon Treaty, just like article III of
the Outer Space Treaty, applies international law and the
United Nations Charter to celestial bodies. 28 As a result, if
these sources of international jurisprudential principles indicate
that "peaceful purposes" as used in the Outer Space Treaty
must be read as simply prohibiting activities of an aggressive
nature, it would seem that they should have the same affect on
"peaceful purposes" as used in article III(1) of the Moon Treaty.
Article 111(4), which prohibits the establishment of military
bases, installations and fortifications, as well as the testing of
any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers, 2 9 is
nothing more than the equivalent of the second sentence of the
second paragraph of article IV of the Outer Space Treaty and
should be attributed no other significance.
Notwithstanding the logical similarities between the Outer
Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty, article III(1) need not be
read as establishing a standard which simply prohibits activities
of an aggressive nature. Indeed, the principal argument advanced for demonstrating that "peaceful purposes" as used in
the Outer Space Treaty prohibits all activities of a military
nature can be made with facility comparable to that which is evident in making the argument that it prohibits only activities of
an aggressive nature. Specifically, some have pointed out that,
in view of the obligation stated in article I(1) of the Outer Space
Treaty to use celestial bodies for "the benefit and in the interests of all countries," 3 0 the term "peaceful purposes" in the

28. Moon Treaty, supra note 2 art. II provides:
All activities on the moon including its exploration and use, shall be carried out
in accordance with international law, in particular the Charter of the United
Nations, and taking into account the Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly
on 24 October 1979, in the interest of maintaining international peace and
security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding,
and with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties.
29. Moon Treaty, supra note 2 and accompanying text of art. III(4).
30. Note 39, infra and accompanying text of art. I(1) of the Outer Space Treaty.
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second paragraph of article IV should be read as establishing a
standard prohibiting all activities of a military nature, whether
or not such activities are aggressive. 31 The quintessence of this
position is that activities of a military nature cannot be in the
benefit and in the interests of "all" countries since, as an inescapable operational fact, the immediate objective sought to be
obtained by such activities neither benefits nor serves the interests of the country, or group of countries, against which the
activities are directed. Given the fact that article IV(1) of the
Moon Treaty also obligates States Parties to use celestial
bodies, including the moon, for the "benefit and in the interests
of all countries,' ,32 it would appear that one could contend that
that phrase has a similar effect on "peaceful purposes" as used
in article III(1).
2. Article I1(2): Attempt At Clarification
The drafters of the Moon Treaty were undoubtedly aware of
the controversy concerning the meaning of "peaceful purposes" as used in the Outer Space Treaty. Indeed, they apparently sought to offer some explication with respect to
"peaceful purposes" in the Moon Treaty by prohibiting, in article 111(2), the threat or use of "force" or "any other hostile act"
on any celestial body, as well as the "use" of any celestial body
for the commission of any threat or act in relation to the earth,
the moon, spacecraft, personnel of spacecraft, or any man-made
space object.'3 Both the scope of applicability of this provision
and its substantive meaning deserve consideration.
A. Scope
Before determining whether the language of article 111(2)
serves to foreclose controversy over the meaning of "peaceful
31. See Markoff, Disarmamentand "Peaceful Purposes" Provisionin the 1967 Outer

Space Treaty, 4 J. SPACE L. 3, 7 (1976) (observing that military activity is actually or
potentially violent and therefore contrary to "peaceful purposes").
32. Moon Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV(1) provides:
The exploration and use of the moon shall be the province of all mankind and
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development. Due regard shall be
paid to the interests of present and future generations as well as to the need to
promote higher standards of living, conditions of economic and social progress
and development in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
33. Moon Treaty, supra note 2 and accompanying text of art. 111(2).
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purposes" in the Moon Treaty, it would appear profitable to
briefly examine the areas covered by the prohibition itself. Of
particular interest is whether the prohibition includes the threat
or use of force or any other hostile act conducted below the surface of celestial bodies. This issue arises because the explicit
language of the opening sentence of article 111(2) simply prohibits the threat or use of force or any other hostile act "on"
celestial bodies and says nothing about those conducted "in"
celestial bodies. 34 The fact that other provisions of the Moon
Treaty, such as article III(3), 3 are, by their explicit terms,
designed to apply to activities conducted "on" as well as "in"
celestial bodies would seem to preclude one from arguing, as
was done earlier with respect to the Outer Space Treaty's prohibition on the installation of nuclear weapons, and other
weapons of mass destruction, that the term "on" also encompasses the concept of "in."
The failure in the first sentence of article 111(2) to explicitly
prohibit the threat or use of force or any other hostile act "in'
celestial bodies may lead some to insist that it is permissible to
conduct such activities below the surface of celestial bodies.
There is some reason, however, to argue that perhaps one need
not read article 111(2) quite so literally. Specifically, it can be
suggested that, notwithstanding both the failure of the first
sentence to mention the term "in" and the inability to argue
that the term "on" encompasses the concept of "in," the second
sentence of article 111(2) serves to prohibit the threat or use of
force or any other hostile act below the surface of celestial
bodies by prohibiting the "use" of celestial bodies for the commission of any threat or use of force or any other hostile act in
relation to the earth, spacecraft and their personnel, man-made
space objects, and other celestial bodies. Reference to the earth,
spacecraft, personnel of spacecraft, man-made space objects,
and celestial bodies exhausts all objects that might be affected
by the prohibited activity. The term "use" would seem to include the performance of prohibited activities by represent34. Id.
35. Moon Treaty, supra note 2 and accompanying text of art. 111(3).
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atives of States Parties while situated somewhere "on" or "in"
a celestial body.
The only other kind of "use" that could possible be affected by
the language is the use of celestial bodies themselves to perform
a prohibited activity; that is, for instance, physically moving a
portion of a celestial body in the direction of someone in order to
threaten or inflict injury. It is doubtful that the drafters had
such a literal and simplistic meaning of the term "use" in mind.
It would appear most accurate, therefore, to view the term
"use" as covering the performance of prohibited activities occurring anywhere on or in celestial bodies.
B. Substantive Meaning
The prohibition of the threat or use of "force" in the first
sentence proscribes exertions of physical power or other forms
of stress against another state. It is doubtful, however, that this
prohibition alone is sufficient to resolve the controversy over
the meaning of "peaceful purposes." Nothing should be more
axiomatic since dispute continues over the meaning of "peaceful purposes" as used in the Outer Space Treaty. Such disagreement endures even though article III of the Outer Space
Treaty 36 declares that the provisions of the United Nations
Charter, including article 2(4), 37 which explicitly prohibits the
threat or use of force by one state against another, applies to
each and every celestial body.
Given this, the only language in the first sentence of article
111(2) which might help elucidate the parameters of "peaceful
purposes" is that prohibiting "any other hostile act." It would
seem safe to assume that since the term "hostile act" follows
36. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7 art. III states:
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the*exploration and use
of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance
with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.
37. U.N. Charter art. 2(4) states, "All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."
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the conjunctive "or," it is intended to proscribe something contradistinct from and less egregious or ominous than a threat or
use of force. Of course, this does not necessarily indicate that in
order to be consonant with the prohibition of "any other hostile
act" the term "peaceful purposes" must be read as prohibiting
the greatest possible amount of military-like activities. To the
contrary, the ambiguity inherent in the term "hostile act"
would seem to permit "peaceful purposes" to be read expansively or narrowly. In this respect, it might be argued that the
term "hostile" is synonymous with the term "aggressive" and
that in prohibiting "any other hostile act" the first sentence of
article 111(2) means that "peaceful purposes" must be seen as

simply prohibiting activities of an aggressive nature. However,
as incredulous as it might seem, another argument might be
that all activities of a military nature are almost by definition
hostile and that, therefore, the prohibition of "any other hostile
act" means that "peaceful purposes" must be viewed as prohibiting all activities of a military nature.
Absent any explicit definition of the term "hostile act," it
would seem near impossible to state categorically which of
these two suggested constructions is accurate. The ineluctable
fact of the matter is that by prohibiting the threat or use of
"force" or "any other hostile act," the Moon Treaty has done
precious little to once and for all "define and develop" the concept of "peaceful purposes"; a concept first applied to the extraterrestial realm by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Any successful effort to clarify this concept would seem to require a
prohibition immensely more explicit than that appearing in the
first sentence of article III(2). 38 If the objective of the members
of the international community is to prohibit all activities of a
military nature, then the language of prohibition should track
that of article I(1) of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. 39 On the
other hand, if the objective is simply to prohibit activities of an
38. Moon Treaty, supra note 2 and accompanying text of art. 111(2).
39. Multilateral Antarctic Treaty, December 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No.
4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. Art. l(1) provides, "Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, interalia, any measures of a military nature, such
as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military
maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons."
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aggressive nature, the language of prohibition should perhaps
consist of two elements: one explicitly prohibiting aggressive or
hostile activities; and another modifying that prohibition by
specifically stating that nothing in the instrument is designed to
prohibit other activities merely because they are of a military
nature. 40 Though there may be dispute as to whether a particular activity should be considered aggressive or hostile, the
intention to avoid prohibiting an activity simply because it is of
a military nature would be unequivocally stated.
3. Right of Self-Defense
Apart from what has already been stated, it might be suggested that "hostile act" was included in order to make it clear
that nothing in article III prohibits States Parties from using
force in self-defense. This suggestion requires that the term
"hostile" be read as synonymous with the term "offensive."
While such a reading is not particularly unpalatable, it would
seem to create unnecessary problems.
Initially, such a suggestion would appear to preclude one from
arguing that a conjunctive reading of the first and second
paragraphs of article III produces a standard which simply prohibits activities of an aggressive nature. This is so because if
such a reading is accurate then there would be no need to use
language directly or indirectly reserving the right of selfdefense. More specifically, since acts of self-defense are, by
definition, defensive rather than aggressive, they would necessarily be left unaffected by a standard which prohibited only
activities of an aggressive nature. Furthermore, such a suggestion would also leave the door open for the contention that since
article IV of the Outer Space Treaty does not contain similar
language, it fails to contemplate States Parties being entitled
lawfully to exercise the right of self-defense. It would seem,
however, that any such contention is patently erroneous. Re40. Such a provision might provide:
1. The moon shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for
peaceful purposes. There shall be prohibited all activities of an aggressive [or
hostile] nature.
2. Nothing in the foregoing provision shall be construed to prevent the conduct
of other activities merely because they are of a military nature.
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gardless of whether or not an international convention purports
to reserve the right of States Parties to use force in selfdefense, that right remains intact. Similarly, regardless of how
restrictively the military provisions of a particular convention
are read, States Parties are clearly entitled to undertake activities of a military nature for purposes of self-defense. There
are, in essence, three reasons for this position.
First, the right of self-defense is recognized as "inherent." As
such it is an inborn, innate, natural, inalienable right which exists from the instant every sovereign state is conceived. 4 1 Being
inalienable, it would seem that in the present decentralized
state of the international law decision-making process neither
its existence nor its exercise can be denied by convention or
otherwise. Second, the inherent nature of the right means that
it need not be explicitly mentioned in every international convention purporting to affect the use of military force in order
for it to be reserved. If this were not so, the unscrupulous
would, as pointed out, indeed suggest that the right does not ex-

ist under conventions failing to somehow reserve

it.42

This

would subject the very survival of some states to the
thoroughness of international diplomats. Finally, and of paramount importance, if it is said that either the failure to reserve
the right or a restrictive reading of the terms of a convention
impairs the ability of States Parties to lawfully take up arms to
protect themselves, then it is clear that those nations interested
in securing an advantage at the expense of another may be in41. U.N. Charter art. 51 provides in pertinent part:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs . ., until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken ... , in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council ...
42. See 1928 U.S. FOREIGN REL., I at 36-37 states with respect to the Kellogg-Briand
Treaty and self-defense:
Express recognition by treaty of this inalienable right, however, gives rise to
the same difficulty encountered in any effort to define aggression. It is the
identical question approached from the other side. Inasmuch as no treaty provision can add to the natural right of self-defense, it is not in the interest of
peace that a treaty should stipulate a juristic conception of self-defense since it
is far too easy for the unscrupulous to mold events to accord with an agreed
definition.
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duced to commit acts of aggression against those which will
refrain from defending themselves because of a sense of responsibility towards their international commitments. The effect of
this would be to undermine the very objective of international
law - to establish a decision-making process which promotes
the peaceful resolution of competing claims and preserves the
sovereign equality, political independence, and territorial integrity of all states. Given the undesirability of such a result,
any reading which calls into question the exercise of the right of
self-defense must be rejected.
III. CONCLUSION

Article III of the Moon Treaty attempts to "define and
develop" the principles stated in article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty. Such an objective is deserving of praise given the increasing potential for military utilization of celestial bodies
which contemporary developments in technology portend. In
some respects article III has succeeded in fully accomplishing
its objective, while in others its success appears to be much
more modest. Specifically, the provisions of article III of the
Moon Treaty designed to denuclearize celestial bodies are a vast
improvement on those portions of the first paragraph of article
IV of the Outer Space Treaty applicable to celestial bodies. The
provisions which govern all other types of military activities,
however, do not improve on the corresponding provisions in the
second paragraph of article IV of the Outer Space Treaty quite
as much. The most noticeable shortcomings in this respect are
the failure to definitively resolve the question as to the meaning
of "peaceful purposes," and the uncertainty as to whether
States Parties are prohibited from undertaking the threat or
use of force or any other hostile act below the surface of
celestial bodies.

